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THE PATENTABILITY OF HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS:
IS THE
INCONSISTENT APPLICATION OF THE EUROPEAN UNION BIOTECHNOLOGY
DIRECTIVE’S MORAL EXCLUSION CLAUSE UNDERMINING INVESTOR
CONFIDENCE IN EUROPE, PROVIDING A COMPETITIVE ADVANTAGE TO THE
UNITED STATES?
Stephen R. Donnelly*

INTRODUCTION
The original justification for Directive 98/44/EC of the European Parliament and of the
Council of 6 July 1998 on the Legal Protection of Biotechnological Inventions (the
Directive)1 was to promote the growth of the European life science sector by
harmonizing and clarifying European biotechnology patent laws.2 As early as 1985, the
European Commission had identified the fragmentation of European patent laws as a
potential problem.3 The Directive thus aimed to address obstacles to the unity of the
internal market, which would arise if national Member States adopted divergent and
uncoordinated policies and legislation in a field of economic activity that had been
earmarked as poised for spectacular growth.4 The Commission further identified the lack
of guidance within the European Patent Convention 1973 (EPC)5 on how its provisions
were to be applied to biotechnological inventions meant that researchers were unsure if
their work could be legally protected within Europe.6
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The Commissions concerns were lent greater political urgency by three significant
events7 that combined to establish the dominance of the United States (U.S.)
biotechnology industry.8 First, biology researchers in the U.S. were increasingly
developing new techniques that had substantial commercial application. Second, the U.S.
Congress created the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit to promote greater
uniformity in the application of patent law and to reduce the possibility of forum
shopping by parties seeking favorable courts.9 Thirdly, the landmark Supreme Court
ruling in Diamond, Commissioner of Patents and Trademarks v Chakrabarty,10 took an
important step towards patent liberalization by stating that living matter was not
excluded as a ‘product of nature’ and that patents shall be available for ‘anything under
the sun made by man’.11 It was not long after the Chakrabarty decision that the U.S.
Patent and Trademark Office (USPTO) began issuing patents on gene fragments,
transgenic bacteria, and cell lines expressing DNA sequences producing therapeutically
useful proteins.12 A trend had been for European companies to move their biotechnology
research from the European Union (EU) to the U.S. because they regarded the
commercial and legal climate there as more encouraging.13 The Commission concluded
that European biotechnology patent laws should be clarified and harmonized in order to
provide the incentives and legal certainty required for the biotechnology industry to
flourish.14
Given the nature of the objectives pursued, one might have expected that the drafting of
the Directive would be a relatively straightforward administrative exercise in
harmonizing the legal criteria of novelty, inventive step, and industrial application in the
context of biotechnological inventions. Indeed, the first draft of the Directive15 framed
the problem solely in these terms with the legal standards proposed largely reflecting the
more permissive approach of the USPTO.16 The project soon ran into difficulties.17
The Directive differs in a key way from the approach of the U.S., as it establishes a
prominent role for ‘morality’ as an evaluative criterion within European patent law.18
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This unique stance emerged during extensive discussions between the Parliament, the
Commission, and the Council, and was a political concession to the view expressed by
the Parliament that the patenting of biological materials, in particular those of human
origin, raises important ethical and social concerns.19 Attempts to address these anxieties
resulted, inter alia, in the inclusion of a ‘morality clause’ in Article 6 of the Directive.20
Article 6(1) provides that inventions shall be considered unpatentable where their
commercial exploitation would be contrary to ordre public or morality. Article 6(2),
intended to clarify how the general morality exclusion in Article 6(1) should be applied,
contains a list of specific examples of biotechnology inventions that are excluded from
patentability on moral grounds.21 Ironically, it has been Article 6(2) that has been the
source of great uncertainties in the years since the Directive was enacted.22 In particular,
questions regarding how Article 6(2)(c), which excludes ‘uses of human embryos for
industrial or commercial purposes’ from patentability, should be applied in relation to
patent applications for inventions concerning human embryonic stem cells (hESCs) have
given rise to long-running legal, ethical, and policy debates.23 The debate revolves
around the fact that Article 6(2)(c) is silent with regard to hESCs.24 This is because the
first ever isolation of hESCs from an embryo was reported four months after the
adoption of the Directive.25
Although the Directive was ‘addressed’ only to EU Member States,26 the European
Patent Office (EPO), which is independent of the EU, voluntarily incorporated the
Directive’s rules within the EPC.27 Thus moral exclusions are now a fixture of European
patent law.28 Most patents in Europe are granted via the EPO; however, European
patents must still be enforced in individual Member States who may interpret the
Directive differently.29 Whereas the EPO has not granted any patents on hESC claims,
an overview of EU Member States interpretation of Article 6(2)(c) reveals a patchwork
of permissive and restrictive regulatory policies towards the patentability of hESCs. In
contrast to Europe, U.S. patent law contains no statutory basis for the USPTO or a court
to deny patent protection to morally controversial biotech subject matter. The U.S. has
adopted probably the most liberal patenting policies on stem cell research, with the
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USPTO granting in excess of forty-one patents that claim hESCs in their title and front
pages.30
The purpose of this paper is to consider whether the inconsistent application of the EU
Biotechnology Directive’s moral exclusion clause could undermine investor confidence
in Europe, providing a competitive advantage to the U.S.31
Understanding the science is essential for engaging in knowledgeable debate about the
ethical issues surrounding hESCs.32 Part II provides an analysis of the biology that
underpins the human embryo setting out the crucial distinction between totipotent and
pluripotent hESCs.33 In Part III our attention turns to pre Directive jurisprudence under
Article 53(a) EPC, where the EPO showed a willingness to interpret the moral exclusion
clause in a narrow manner that afforded patent protection to controversial biotechnology
inventions. It was against the EPC framework and the jurisprudence emerging from the
EPO that the Commission conceived the need for European biotechnology patent laws to
be clarified and harmonized. Part IV charts the troublesome enactment and transposition
of the Biotechnology Directive that exposed inherent European conflicts regarding
patent protection for biotechnological inventions concerning ‘living matter’ of human
origin. In Part V our focus turns to the subsequent emergence of hESC technology,
providing an analysis of the post Directive EPO decision in Edinburgh Patent34 which
set a precedent for the recent decision in Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation
(WARF)35 where the EPO moved away from its pre Directive narrow approach
embracing a broad interpretation of the moral exclusion clause setting out a restrictive
policy on the patentability of hESCs. Part VI analyses the patentability of hESCs at the
national level, comparing the relatively permissive United Kingdom (UK) and Swedish
regulatory approaches to the more restrictive German regime, a comparison that raises
interesting questions as to the legal certainty of biotechnology inventions claiming
hESCs within Europe. In Part VII our attention turns to the patentability of hESCs in the
U.S. This section of the paper begins with an analysis of the Constitutional basis of U.S.
patent law prior to setting out the link between ‘utility’ and ‘morality’ in U.S. patent law.
Part VII then considers the liberation of U.S. patent law, the application of the Thirteenth
Amendment to biotechnological inventions, along with the rejection of the doctrine of
moral utility before finally examining the recent full frontal attack on biotechnology
patents in the U.S. and the reinstatement of federal funding for hESC research.
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HUMAN EMBRYONIC STEM CELLS – THE SCIENCE

When human life begins with the union of the sperm and egg, there is but one cell: the
zygote. Over a matter of hours this cell divides and divides again and at this stage the
cells that are created have no dedicated function they are said to be undifferentiated.36
Within this initial period, lasting no more than 3-4 days, these undifferentiated hESCs
are totipotent, each having the capacity to become a complete and separate embryo.37
Therefore, totipotent hESCs have the potential to develop into an entire human body.38
By days 5-7 the organism has become a blastocyst, a ball of around 100 cells each of
which is now pluripotent, that is, each has the capacity to develop into any of the 200
cells types that make up the human body, for example heart muscle cells39 and possibly
even organs in due course,40 but it is no longer possible for them to develop into separate
embryos or an entire human body.41
The patenting of hESCs is highly ethically contentious, as it involves the destruction of
viable human embryos in the process of the extraction of hESCs from the inner cell mass
of the early stage blastocyst.42 Many believe that the human embryo, from the moment
of fertilization, should be protected as a full grown human being or at least merits respect
incompatible with its use as a mere means to obtaining stem cells.43 In their opinion,
killing embryos for stem cells can never be justified, even if this would save or improve
the lives of millions of people.44
The utilitarian approach argues there are no principled reasons not to produce, destroy,
and use embryos for research and therapeutic purposes were such destruction benefits
man kind.45 The most high profile and widely anticipated use of hESCs is the creation of
therapeutic products to treat a range of serious and debilitating medical conditions
caused by cell damage; including spinal cord injury, heart disease, and neurological
disorders such as Parkinson’s disease and Alzheimer’s disease. This would be achieved
by generating replacement cells or tissues and injecting them into damaged areas within
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the body. Although much work remains to be done to demonstrate both the safety46 and
effectiveness47 of therapeutic stem cell technology, hESCs have become a source of
hope for the sufferers of serious illness and injury around the world.48
Sales of commercial stem cells products were projected to reach US$ 87 million in 2008
soaring to US$ 8.5 billion within a decade. Due to profound investments poured into
hESC research, stem cell technology is heavily reliant on patent protection.49 However,
the first controversial biotechnological inventions concerning ‘living matter’ that came
before the EPO, under the moral exclusion clause in Article 53(a) EPC, did not concern
hESCs, they concerned the patenting of animals, plants, and human tissue.
II.

PRE-DIRECTIVE MORAL EXCLUSIONS UNDER ARTICLE 53(A) EPC

The EPC 1973 is an international treaty in force since 1977. The concept of a ‘European
patent’, really only a bundle of national patents, predominates by virtue of the EPC. The
EPC established the EPO, and also sets out the substantive law on patentability and
exclusions in all EPC signatory states.50 Neither the EPO nor the provisions of the EPC
require Member States to bring their national patent laws and practice into conformity
with the EPC, but most of the Member States have actually amended their laws to
achieve such conformity, and national patent authorities follow the case law of the
EPO.51 This represents ‘cold harmonization’.52 The EPC is not an instrument of EU law.
The EPO is therefore not an organ of the EU, and the EU institutions have no
jurisdiction over the EPC.
The Guidelines for Examination first published by the EPO in 197753 outline the policy
underlying the interpretation of the moral exclusion clause under Article 53(a) EPC. The
Guidelines state that the purpose of the exclusion is to prevent the patenting of
inventions likely to induce riot or public disorder or to lead to criminal or other generally
offensive behavior. It is to be invoked only in rare and extreme circumstances. The
Guidelines suggest ‘a fair test to apply is to consider whether it is probable that the
public in general would regard the invention as so abhorrent that the grant of patent
rights would be inconceivable’.54 The EPC, however, was not drafted with the special
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characteristics of biotechnological research and inventions in mind.55 Biotechnology
presented the EPO with a set of problems with which they are uncomfortable.56 The
early jurisprudence, however, shows a willingness by the EPO to interpret Article 53(a)
EPC in a narrow manner that afforded protection to new technology.57
i.

Harvard/Onco-Mouse

The role of the morality exclusion under the Article 53(a) EPC was first considered in
the notorious 1989 Harvard/Onco-Mouse58 decision.59 The case concerned the
patentability of mice that had been genetically modified so that they would develop
cancer: a result that the applicants hoped would be useful in cancer research.60 The
Examining Division of the EPO initially rejected the applicant’s patent application
stating patent law, and Article 53(a) in particular, was not the correct legislative tool for
regulating problems arising in connection with genetic modification of organisms.61 On
appeal, the Technical Board of Appeal (TBA) disagreed with the Examining Division,
stating in a case like this there were compelling reasons why the implications of Article
53(a) should be considered such as the interests in remedying human diseases, avoiding
animal suffering, and environmental concerns.
The TBA, referring to its previous jurisprudence in Lubrizol/Hybrid Plants,62 held ‘any
exception (to patentability) under Article 53(a) EPC must be narrowly construed’. Under
a utilitarian balancing of risks and benefits the TBA explained that the Onco-Mouse’s
purposes of facilitating cancer research was of great importance for human health and
welfare, and the benefits outweighed the adverse consequences of the invention.63 The
Examining Division,64 directed to do so by the TBA, concluded that the invention could
not be considered immoral so as to preclude it from patentability by virtue of Article
53(a). However, the Examining Division stressed that the considerations outlined applied
solely to the present case.65 The balancing test in Onco-Mouse provides an example of
‘asking questions first, patenting later’. One problem with the test is that the Examining
Division never defined morality nor stated a rational basis for choosing those particular
factors to balance as opposed to other possible concerns.66 Nevertheless, the test does
provide the EPO with a mechanism for evaluating the patent eligibility of morally
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controversial biotech inventions under Article 53(a) before granting a patent. In two later
cases, the EPO articulated two additional morality tests.67
ii.

Plant Genetic Systems v Greenpeace

In Plant Genetic Systems v Greenpeace,68 Greenpeace objected to a patent that had been
granted for a genetically engineered plant on the grounds that it was inherently immoral
and created risks to the environment.69 The Opposition Division rejected the opposition
and Greenpeace then appealed to the TBA.70 In framing the nature of the morality
inquiry under Article 53(a), the TBA looked to the intent of the drafters of the EPC, as
evidenced by historical documents, and explained:
The concept of morality is related to the belief that some behavior is
right and acceptable whereas other behavior is wrong, this belief being
founded on the totality of the accepted norms, which are deeply rooted
in a particular culture. For the purposes of the EPC, the culture in
question is…European society and civilization. Accordingly, under
Article 53(a) EPC, inventions the exploitation of which is not in
conformity with the conventionally accepted standards of conduct
pertaining to this culture are to be excluded from patentability as being
contrary to morality.71
The Board concluded that none of the claims in the patent violated the morality
provision of Article 53(a) because they concerned ‘activities and products which cannot
be considered to be wrong as such in the light of conventionally accepted standards of
conduct of European culture.’ In other words, the Board ignored the more fundamental
concerns regarding the patent’s subject matter and focused narrowly on the general types
of products and activities the patent concerned. This narrow focus allowed the Board to
avoid broader concerns and tied patentability to the ‘public acceptability’ of the general
categories of patentable subject matter.72
In reaching its decision, the Opposition Division expressly declined to employ the
balancing test used in the Harvard/Onco-Mouse decision, noting that it ‘(was) not the
only way of assessing patentability’ under Article 53(a) but was ‘just one possible way,
perhaps useful in situations in which an actual damage (e.g., suffering of
animals)…exists.’73 This ‘unacceptability’ standard is certainly a lower hurdle for an
invention to overcome than the Harvard/Onco-Mouse balancing test, because balancing
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does not even come into play unless concrete societal disadvantages of the invention are
presented.74
A criticism of the EPO ruling in Plant Genetic Systems lies in the fact that there is scant
evidence suggesting a culture inherent in European society. If there were such a culture,
Article 53(a) second half sentence, namely, that relating to law and regulation in some or
all of the Contracting States would be redundant. This part of Article 53(a) is an
acknowledgement that behavior acceptable in some Member States can be unacceptable
in others.75 The European Group on Ethics in Science and New Technologies (EGE) has
stated that ‘Pluralism may be seen as a characteristic of the EU’ and ‘respect for diverse
national culture is essential to the building of Europe.’76
iii.

Howard Florey/H2 Relaxin

The third test for patentability under Article 53(a) EPC was set out in Howard Florey/H2
Relaxin.77 The application was for a patent for the DNA sequences of a naturally
occurring substance that relaxes the uterus during childbirth, which is obtained from the
human ovary.78 Several groups filed an opposition to the issuance of the patent on the
basis that the patent offended Article 53(a) because, among other things, it covered the
patenting of human genes and involved taking tissue from a pregnant woman, thus
offending human dignity. The EPO Board disagreed and articulated the ‘public
abhorrence’ test for exclusion under Article 53(a):
A fair test to apply is to consider whether it is probable that the public
in general would regard the invention as so abhorrent that the grant of
patent rights would be inconceivable. If it is clear that this is the case,
objection should be raised under Article 53(a); otherwise not.
According to the Opposition Division, it would be abhorrent to the overwhelming
majority of the public if the invention involved the patenting of human life, an abuse of
pregnant women, or a return to slavery. The EPO noted that the tissue used in the
research was donated during the course of necessary gynecological operations and thus
had not offended ‘human dignity’. Moreover, the Opposition Division stated that the
argument that the applicant was ‘patenting life’ was misconceived, as DNA, once
extracted and treated, was characterized not as ‘life’, but as a substance carrying genetic
information, which can be used to produce proteins that are medically useful.79
Finally, the Opposition Division rejected the assertion that such patenting was equivalent
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to slavery on the ground that such an assertion misunderstood the nature of a patent. This
was because a patent does not give the proprietor any rights over a human being; all a
patent monopoly provides is the right to prevent someone from practicing the same
invention.80 The significance of permitting the patent meant that the Opposition Division
condoned the commercialization of human genes under the EPC.81 The decision also
provides guidance for future cases as to what constitutes an abhorrent invention
precluded from patentability.82
The ‘public abhorrence’ test thus presents an even lower hurdle for a morally
controversial invention to overcome since fewer inventions are likely to be deemed
‘abhorrent’ to society than simply ‘unacceptable’ to society. Importantly, none of the
three tests requires the exclusion of patentability to be tied to a ban on the commercial
exploitation of the invention.83 It was against the EPC framework, and the confusing
jurisprudence relating to the legal protection of biological inventions emerging from the
EPO, that the Commission conceived the need for further patent law harmonization.84
III. ADOPTION AND TRANSPORTATION OF THE BIOTECHNOLOGY DIRECTIVE
The Biotechnology Directive, first proposed by the Commission in 1988,85 turned out to
be one of the most heavily lobbied and controversial pieces of legislation ever produced
through the European democratic process.86 As early as 1989, the Parliament took the
view that the Directive, whose original version did not contain a specific morality
clause,87 would need to pay greater attention to the moral aspects of biotechnology
patenting.88 Thus in stark contrast to the comparatively uncontroversial extension of
patent protection to biotechnological inventions in the U.S., questions of morality
provided a central point of reference for debates on the acceptable limits of patent law in
Europe.89 The Directive’s adoption, in 1998, came after ten years of difficult
negotiations, and followed the Parliament’s rejection of an earlier draft in March 2005.90
In essence, the Directive establishes a harmonized framework for the patentability of
biotechnological products and processes throughout Europe. It clarifies that in
accordance with the general principles of patent law, intellectual property protection will
be available for biotechnological inventions that satisfy the requirements of novelty,
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inventive step, and industrial application. Further guidance is given on the legal
distinction between a non-patentable ‘discovery’ and a patentable ‘invention’.91 The
Directive was ‘addressed’ only to EU Member States,92 obliging them to amend their
national biotechnology patent laws in order to comply with the Directive by the deadline
of 30 July 2000.93 The EPO voluntarily incorporated the Directive’s rules within the
EPC in June 1999 via the insertion of a new Chapter VI, Article 53(a) of the EPC,94
entitled ‘Biotechnological Inventions’, into Part II of the EPC Implementing
Regulations.95 The incorporation of the Directive rules within the EPC was to ensure
consistency of approach as between EU Member States and the EPO. Article 6(2)(c) of
the Directive was transposed as Rule 23d(c) EPC (now Rule 28(c) EPC 2000).96
The EPO began examining and granting patents in accordance with the principles set out
by the Directive when the new provisions entered into force on 1 September 1999.97 The
EPO’s willingness to transpose the provisions of the Directive was not shared by all EU
Member States. Even after the adoption of the Directive in 1998, the compromise that
was eventually brokered was still not acceptable to all countries.98 Due to the strong and
diverging opinions surrounding the ‘patents of life’ issue, the process of implementation
was severely protracted in many Member States.99 Several EU Member States defied EU
law by failing to create national laws to implement the Directive by the deadline.100 In
the Council, the Netherlands, who refused to apply patent law to living biotechnological
material,101 had voted against the Directive, and Belgium and Italy had abstained.102
Upon enactment the legality of the Directive was immediately challenged by the
Member States before the Court of Justice of the European Communities (ECJ).
i.

Netherlands v Parliament and Council

In The Kingdom of the Netherlands v European Parliament and Council103 the
government of the Netherlands, joined by Italy and Norway, sought to annul the
Directive in its entirety. The Netherlands put forward six arguments, namely that Article
100(a) of the EC Treaty was the incorrect legal basis for the Directive, breach of the
principles of subsidiarity, breach of the principle of legal certainty, breach of obligations
in international law, breach of the fundamental right to respect for human dignity, and
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breach of the procedural rules in the adoption of the Commission’s proposal.104 In
rejecting the applicants’ submissions that Article 5(1) of the Directive, in providing for
the patentability of isolated elements of the human body, undermined human dignity, the
Court took note of its obligations to ensure respect within the EC for the fundamental
right to human dignity and integrity, but found that Article 5(1) was framed in stringent
enough terms to ensure that the human body is unavailable for patenting and inalienable
and to safeguard human dignity. There was, the Court reasoned, a difference between the
discovery of a DNA sequence or of an element of the human body, neither of which
would, as such, be patentable under the Directive, and inventions combining one of these
natural elements with a technical process or application.
The Netherlands argued that Article 6(1) of the Directive infringes the principle of legal
certainty on the grounds that it gives insufficient guidance and is too general and
equivocal in determining whether there is an infringement of ordre public or morality.
AG Jacob stated:
It is common ground that this provision allows the administrative
authorities and courts of the Member State a wide scope for maneuver
in applying this exclusion. However that scope for maneuver is
necessary to take account of the particular difficulties to which the use
of certain patents may give rise in the social and cultural context of
each Member State, a context which the national legislative,
administrative and court authorities are better placed to understand
than the Community authorities.105
The Directive, therefore, does not infringe the principle of legal certainty because,
among other things, the application by national authorities of the concepts of ordre
public and morality will always be subject to review by the Court. Attention was also
drawn to Article 6(2).106 The Court concluded that ‘as regards living matter of human
origin, the Directive frames the law on patents in a manner sufficiently rigorous to
ensure that the human body effectively remains unavailable and inalienable and that
human dignity is thus safeguarded.107 Under the Netherlands reasoning Howard
Florey/H2 Relaxin may be decided differently under the Biotechnology Directive.108
The ECJ upheld the legality of the Directive, but opposition to the Directive was so
fierce that despite losing the legal challenge, eight of the fifteen EU Member States
(Austria, Belgium, France, Germany, Italy, Luxemburg, the Netherlands, and Sweden)
had not incorporated the Directive into their national laws by the end of 2003,109 and
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four were still out of compliance in early 2005.110 The Commission took action against
Italy.
ii.

Commission v Italy

The leading ECJ case on the interpretation of the illustrative list of exclusions in Article
6(2) of the Directive describes the correct interpretative approach.111 In Commission v.
Italy112 the ECJ ruled:
Unlike Article 6(1) of the Directive, which allows the administrative
authorities and courts of Member States a wide discretion in applying
the general moral exclusion on inventions whose commercial
exploitation would be contrary to ordre public and morality, Article
6(2) allows Member States no discretion in the implementation of the
specific exclusions, since the very purpose of this provision is to give
definition to the exclusion laid down in Article 6(1).113
The critical aspect of the ruling is the Court’s insistence that the test to be applied to the
interpretation of the list of specific exclusions under Article 6(2) is definitional, not
moral. The implication is that, when reading and interpreting the specific exclusion, the
words have to be given their natural meaning. Additional words should not be imported
to vary, broaden, or narrow the exclusion in order to instantiate the alleged underlying
moral consensus since, as stated by the Court, the specific exclusion is already
illustrative of the principle.114
The specific list of exclusions, the ECJ reasoned, reflect the legislative consensus on
inventions considered by the drafters to be morally unpatentable at the time.115 The
wording of Article 6(2)(c) specifically excludes from patentability ‘uses of human
embryos for industrial or commercial purposes’, not patents for inventions involving
destruction of a human embryo. The fact that a wording precluding patents on
uses/involving destruction of human embryos was not agreed upon at the time is both
significant and not surprising in the light of the fact that the Directive was not intended
to alter existing patent law116 and render unpatentable inventions based on activities
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which were considered morally permissible and were lawful in Member States at the
time.117 Supportive of this stance is the statement from Rothley118 (the rapporteur):
In relation to the use of embryos, the Council has set some limitations:
they are not to be used for industrial or commercial purposes. But I
would only ask you to remember that this was done with the UK in
mind. We cannot as European legislators decree that something which
does not contravene the underlying legal principles of all Member
States is a contravention of public order, and we cannot brand
something that we do not jointly regard as abhorrent as a contravention
to common decency. That is not acceptable.119
When viewed in this light the legislative history of the provision may therefore actually
constitute as yet a relevant aspect of the argumentation in favour of a narrow reading of
Article 6(2)(c).120 An analysis of the drafting history of the Directive indicates that the
drafters did not specifically consider the question of the patenting of hESC related
inventions,121 and therefore how Articles 5, 6(1), and 6(2)(c) would be applied to hESC
technology.122 This is despite the fact that there had been some mention of the
hypothetical use of hESCs as the next progression from primate ESC research carried
out from 1995 onwards.123
IV. THE EMERGENCE OF hESC TECHNOLOGY
The first isolation of hESCs by Wisconsin biologist and inventor James Thomson was
reported in November 1998, four months after the Directive’s adoption.124 Therefore,
controversy over the patentability of hESCs in Europe emerged as the wording of Article
6(2)(c) was thrown into question by rapid scientific advances.125 The first formal
question to the Commission on the applicability of the Directive to hESC patents was
posed on the 7th December 1998 by Doeke Eisma of the European Liberal Democratic
and Reform Party.126 The written question requested that the Commission clarify
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whether Article 5 of the Directive would prohibit the patenting of the invention of a
method of growing hESCs in a laboratory. The Commission’s reply, of 16 February
1999, stated that although the patenting of hESC related technology might engage
Articles 5 and 6(2)(c), it did not have jurisdiction over this particular question, and
should the issue arise, it would be the patent offices of the Member States and the
national judges before whom the matter was brought that would decide.127 In fact, it was
not cases before national patent offices and courts, but rather patent applications at the
EPO that would initially trigger debate on the patenting of hESCs.128
i.

The Edinburgh Patent

The Edinburgh Patent129 application to the EPO ‘involved removing stem cells from
human embryos, genetically manipulating these cells and cultivating genetically
manipulated embryos from them’.130 The Examining Division granted the patent. There
was opposition against the patent by the governments of Germany, Italy and the
Netherlands.131 In contrast to this opposition, a Report by the EGE132 concluded that
there was no ethical obstacle to patentability attached to processes involving hESCs
whatever their source.133 The Opposition Division, in one of the first decisions to
consider the new provisions under Rule 23d(c), acknowledged there was no uniform
approach with regard to hESCs reflected in legislation or in other conventionally
accepted standards of conduct in European culture, and decided to maintain the patent
with amended claims, including claims to stem cells per se, but with a disclaimer to
human or animal embryonic stem cells removing same from the scope of the patent.
The Opposition Division observed that the exclusion under Rule 23d(c) could be
interpreted in either a narrow or a broad fashion.134 Under the narrow interpretation only
commercial uses of embryos as such would be excluded from patentability. The broad
interpretation would mean that patents would be precluded not only on industrial and
commercial uses of human embryos, but also on hESCs retrieved by the destruction of
human embryos, irrespective of whether the application discloses direct use of the
human embryo or not. According to the Opposition Division, Rule 23d(c) had to be
construed broadly. This was because embryos as such are already ‘protected’ by Rule
23(e) (the equivalent of Article 5(1) of the Directive) and therefore interpreting Rule
23d(c) in the same way as Rule 23(e) would result in redundancy that would undermine
the intention of the legislator.135 In 2005, the President of the EPO suspended the issue
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of new patents in respect of hESC technology because ‘there are too many ethical
aspects that have not been resolved at the political level’.136
Notwithstanding the amendment to the patent claims, Edinburgh still appealed. After a
decade of legal battle, this longstanding appeal was withdrawn during oral proceedings
before the EPO Board of Appeal in November 2007.137 The decision in Edinburgh is
significant in terms of the moral provisions in European patent law as it is a clear
departure from the EPO’s pre Directive ‘morality rulings’ where it held that exceptions
to patentability must be interpreted narrowly.138 The decision set a precedent, which
informed the recent decision in Wisconsin Alumni Research Foundation (WARF).139
ii.

WARF

The application filed by WARF, based on research carried out by James Thomson,140
concerned a method for obtaining embryonic stem cell cultures from a primate embryo
as well as the cell cultures themselves.141 In 2004, the Examining Division held the
claims that could be extended to hESCs must be rejected on the grounds of morality, as
even though the isolated hESCs are not themselves ‘embryos’, hESCs cannot be
obtained without an embryo’s prior destruction.142 WARF appealed the decision to the
TBA and also requested that the Enlarged Board of Appeal (EBA) should refer the issue
of the interpretation of the Directive to the ECJ as it involved the application of EU
law.143
The TBA expressed doubts of the ethicality of approaching an Article 53(a) EPC
assessment of hESC related inventions by means of applying the balancing test as set out
in the Onco-Mouse decision.144 ‘The Board has doubts, whether, when it comes to
human life, it would be ethically acceptable to make a decision be weighing the interests
of human beings which could potentially benefit from the exploitations of the technology
against a right, if any, of human embryos’.145
In 2005, the TBA in accordance with Article 112(a) EPC referred a series of questions
relating to the interpretation of Rule 23d(c) to the EBA. At the end of 2008, the EBA
issued its eagerly awaited decision.146 The EBA refused WARF’s request to make a
reference to the ECJ as there was a lack of any legal and institutional link between the
EPO and the EU and there was no mechanism for making a reference to the Court. The
ruling therefore distinguishes the EPO from the EU. The EPO sees itself as an
international organization: in its view the EPC contracting states, not all of who are EU
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Member States, cannot be presumed to have conferred jurisdiction to the ECJ.147 The
EBA proceeded to consider the four questions referred by the TBA.148
1.

Did the prohibition in respect of biotechnological inventions concerning
the use of human embryos for industrial or commercial purposes apply
retrospectively to applications filed before the implementation of the
Directive into the EPC?

2.

If the answer to Question 1 was yes, did it make any difference to the
validity of the application that the method involving the destruction of
embryos did not form part of the claim?

3.

If the answer to Question 1 or 2 was no, did the prohibition under the EPC
to inventions contrary to morality apply?

4.

In the context of Question 2 and 3, did it make any difference that after the
filing date the products claimed could have been obtained without using the
method that involved the destruction of human embryos?

On assessing Question 1, the EBA noted that no transitional provisions were made when
the Directive was implemented by the EPO and there was no indication that the
commercial exploitation of embryos had previously been regarded as patentable.
Therefore, the prohibition concerning the use of human embryos for industrial or
commercial purposes applied to all pending applications retrospectively.149
For Question 2, the EBA noted that the aim of the implementing rules was to align the
EPC with the Directive and that the Directive was to be used as a supplementary means
of interpretation. As the invention described in the WARF application could be
performed only by destroying human embryos, and the invention was of commercial and
or industrial benefit, it clearly fell within the scope of the prohibition on using human
embryos for industrial or commercial purposes. The Board went on to turn down
WARF’s argument that the legislative history of the provision indicated a narrowing of
the provision given its amended wording. On the contrary, the Board argued that the
legislator’s choice to lastly include the reference to industrial and commercial purposes
does not evidence such narrowing. Instead of evidencing narrowing of the provision’s
application, the Board relied upon the legislative history of Article 23d(c) in the course
of arguing in favour of a broad interpretation of the reference to industrial or commercial
purposes.150 Thus, the EBA concluded that the exception for inventions for therapeutic
or diagnostic purposes which are applied to the human embryo and useful to it did not
apply, as the invention had to benefit the embryo itself, and this was not the case in the
present application as the embryos used to perform the invention were destroyed.151
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Given that the answers to Question 1 and 2 were yes, the EBA decided it was not
necessary to answer Question 3. With respect to Question 4, the EBA ruled the technical
developments that became publicly available only after the filing date could not be taken
into consideration. Therefore, it was irrelevant that after the filing date the same products
could have been obtained without having to use the method that necessarily involved the
destruction of human embryos.
The EBA decision is potentially open to two interpretations. On a narrow interpretation
of the ruling, drawing on the EBA’s concluding statement that the decision is confined to
the facts of the case and not concerned with the patentability of hESCs in general, the
exclusion would be restricted to inventions the practice of which involves direct
destruction of human embryos in the practice of the invention.152 Patent protection for
methods and for human stem cells per se based upon cells derived from existing cell
lines would appear to be unaffected by the ruling.153 Given recent advances in stem cell
technology, the ruling could not reasonably be extended to induced pluripotent stem
cells, or to those methods of obtaining hESCs that do not require destruction of a viable
embryo.154 A narrow interpretation of the EBA’s decision should therefore allow patents
to be granted for hESC research where a stem cell bank rather than an embryo is
identified in the patent as the source.155 Indeed, the Geron Corporation,156 the exclusive
licensee of the WARF patents, commented that the EBA ruling should not adversely
effect its patent applications relating to research performed using existing hESC lines
available from stem cell banks.157
On the broadest interpretation, the exclusion would reach to all downstream inventions
based on the original ‘morally tainted’ inventions involving destructive use of human
embryos.158 The broad interpretation is based upon three key elements.159 Firstly, the
moral prohibition relates not to the act of patenting, but to the performing of the
invention, which includes a step (the use involving its destruction of a human embryo)
that has to be considered to contravene those concepts. The logical implication of this
approach, which does indeed stand out as the most plausible, particularly in light of
Article 38 of the Preamble, is that there must be an alignment between moral norms
applied within patent law and the moral norms outside patent law, as implied by Recital
39 of the Directive. The second element is the finding that the nature of the immoral act
attending the invention is the destruction of human embryos. The third and final element
is the conflation and collapse of the distinction between industrial and commercial uses
of human embryos into the making of the invention. In response to the applicant’s
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submission that some uses of embryos do not fit the categories of ‘industrial’ or
‘commercial’, the EBA ruled that whilst the wording of the exclusion in Article 23d(c)
alluded specifically to uses of embryos which are ‘industrial’ or ‘commercial’, and stated
that making the claimed product remains commercial or industrial exploitation of the
invention even where there is an intention to use that product for further research.160
The EBA’s construction draws on EU sources such as the drafting history of the
Directive and funding policy of the Commission under the Framework Programs
excluding funding for research involving destructive use of human embryos to justify the
scope of the exclusion.161 As the judgment of a supreme tribunal purporting to
pronounce on European patent law, the EBA’s ruling is singularly isolationist and bereft
of references to the interpretation and application of similar principles by other supreme
courts, most notably in this instance, the ECJ.162 Looking to the broader backdrop of the
EU legal order, a broad exclusionary approach to Article 23d(c) is arguably untenable as
it brings into conflict moral exclusions on patents in the Directive with the moral
parameters of existing legislative controls on the practice of inventions involving human
embryos and hESCs outside patent law in other EU Directives and Regulations. Since
2004, the use of human embryonic tissue in the context of inventions with a research
purpose falls to be regulated by the Directive on Human Tissue and Cells.163 The
Regulation on Advanced Therapies and Medicinal Products164 was specifically targeted
at ‘Regenerative medicine’, i.e. the use of genes, cells, and tissues which are anticipated
to offer huge therapeutic potential, notably diseases like Alzheimer’s and Parkinson’s
which are of high prevalence in an ageing population.165 Indeed, Recital 17 of the
Biotechnology Directive is expressly aimed at encouraging the development of
regenerative therapies.
The analysis of EU legislation on advanced therapies indicates that the industrial and
commercial exploitation of hESC and tissue based products in Europe is not only not
prohibited, whether destructive of human embryos or not, but was considered by the EU
legislator as conferring important potential economic and health benefits to citizens in
Europe. The implications for patent law are critical, as the combined body of EU
legislation on the licensing and marketing of medicinal products on human tissue and
cells, including hESCs, clearly indicate that industrial and commercial uses of such
products are subject to morally permissive regulatory controls.166 If the EBA’s
construction of Article 23d(c) is correct, then there is a systemic conflict within EU law
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between legislation which permits the conduct of activities involving destructive uses of
human embryos, including product development on an industrial and commercial basis,
yet precludes the grant of property rights on the related inventions as ‘immoral’. An
interpretation introducing this level of conflict between patent law and national/EU laws
outside patent law creates systemic incoherence and ultimately violates the principle of
legal certainty. It also looks suspiciously like a subversion of Article 14 of the Preamble
of the Biotechnology Directive.167 A better approach is to construe the scope of the rights
granted and excluded on moral grounds in the Biotechnology Directive consistently with
the moral consensus evidenced in the cognate EU legislation on moral exclusions, as
well as jurisprudence of the ECJ on the Directive, thereby aligning moral controls within
patent law with moral controls outside patent law and in this way achieve legal certainty
whilst preserving the integrity of the EU legal order.168
The EPO is not the only institution authorized to issue patents within Europe. National
patent offices grant patents that are valid within their own national jurisdictions, and may
offer an alternative route to obtaining protection.169
V.

THE PATENTABILITY OF hESCS AT NATIONAL LEVEL

An overview of EU Member States reveals a patchwork of divergent regulatory policies
towards to patenting of hESCs.170 There is, however, consensus among Member States,
in view of the potentiality of totipotent hESCs, that such cells are not patentable because
the human body at various stages of its formation and development cannot constitute
patentable inventions under Article 5(1)171 of the Directive.172 In contrast, the picture
across Europe is altogether different in regard to the patentability of pluripotent hESCs
with contrasting approaches.173
i.

The United Kingdom

The UK Intellectual Property Office (UKIPO) is a patent office with a liberal approach
towards hESC inventions. In 2009, the UKIPO revised its practice on hESCs to take
account of the ruling in WARF.174 The revised practice introduces a new condition under
which patents on pluripotent hESCs will be granted provided they satisfy the normal
requirement for patentability and that ‘at the filing or priority date, the invention could
be obtained by means other than the destruction of human embryos’. Revision of the
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UKIPO policy was seemingly in response to recent judicial dicta in the English higher
courts calling for an alignment of national patent law with EPO law.175
Strictly, the wording of the restriction suffers from the same defect as the EBA ruling in
WARF, in that it does not indicate clearly whether the exclusion applies only to
inventions the practice of which necessitates direct use (involving destruction) of a
human embryo, or whether the exclusion also reaches to downstream inventions
involving, for instance, differentiation of established hESC lines whose original
derivation necessitated destruction of a human embryo.176 In contrast to the EPO, the
UKIPO practice hitherto has been to grant patents on downstream hESC derivatives.177
A survey of stem cell patents granted in January 2009 shows that the UKIPO had
granted just under 100 patents to both UK and non-UK residents and there were four
times as many applications as grants.178 It has been noted that applicants have taken
advantage of this more sympathetic forum.179 For example, one German company,
Axiogenesis (Germany), has filed a hESC related patent application180 at the UKIPO in
addition to its application to the EPO.181
ii.

Sweden

The Swedish Act on Ethics Review of Research Involving Humans182 sets up a
mandatory system for pre-examination of research on humans by regional ethical
committees. The institutional framework of research ethics review has a practical
influence on the application of the patent morality clause by the Swedish Patent and
Registration Office (SPRO) when examining patent applications. The SPRO has adopted
the view that a patent application on subject matter resulting from research given
permission after pre-ethical examination renders unnecessary further evaluation by the
patent examiner from an ordre public or morality perspective. On the other hand,
disapproved research is likely to be held unpatentable. This is an example of a
functioning relationship between ethical legislation and the ethical provisions in patent
law, ensuring coherence between permissible research and patentable subject matter. The
practical application of this framework has also been confirmed in Sweden’s attitude
towards the application of the embryo exclusion.183 The SPRO has granted a WARF
patent concerning an invention consisting of a method for differentiation of hESCs into
hematopoetic cells.184 When granting this patent the subject of whether such claims
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complied with the Swedish Patent Act, s1.c.3 (the implementation of Article 6(2)(c))
was considered. The conclusion was that it did, for the following reasons:
To produce hESCs, human embryos are required. However, the
present method does not require that the stem cells need to be
produced from embryos as a consequence of the invention, since the
method can be performed using already existing (deposited) stem
cells.185
Thus, the Swedish view was that the commercial exploitation of this method does not
need the use of a human embryo - the stem cells may have been isolated long before the
invention was made. The object of the provision in Article 6(2)(c) was to avoid a
repetitive use of the humans or parts of humans such as embryos, thus leading to an
instrumentation of humans/embryos. This invention is not directly linked to the use of an
embryo and moreover does not repeatedly need human embryos. Accordingly, the
Swedish concept of morality did not hinder the grant of the WARF patent.186 The
reasoning has been confirmed in a later decision.187
iii. Germany
The German Patents Act contains, in s.2, the morality clause as well as the exemplifying
list.188 According to the last sentence of s.2, relevant provisions of the Embryo
Protection Act (EPA) are applicable to s.2(2) 1-3 of the Patents Act, including the
embryo exclusion. The EPA189 regulates the use of reproduction technology and the
handling of human embryos in Germany. The reference establishes a connection
between the strict regulations in the EPA and the relevant exclusions in the Patents
Act.190
The EPA prohibits the disposal of, hand over, acquire, or use of a human embryo
produced outside the human body with a purpose not serving its preservation,
notwithstanding how the embryo was extracted.191 S.2(2) further prohibits the
development of a human embryo outside the body for any purpose other than assisted
reproduction. The Act establishes an absolute ban on embryo-consuming techniques and
consequently also on the production of hESCs and stem cell lines.192 The creation of
embryos for research purposes, and the use of supernumerary IVF embryos for research
are strictly forbidden. The strict provisions of the EPA limit the possible industrial,
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commercial, therapeutic or diagnostic uses of human embryos in Germany to an absolute
minimum.193
hESCs in general do not literally fall under the provisions of the EPA, since this Act
specifically regulates the uses of human embryos. The definition of a human embryo is
found in s.8 of the Act, and is based upon the capability of the material to develop into a
human being. With this decisive factor not only embryos are covered by the scope of the
Act, but also totipotent cells. An e contrario interpretation of the definition would
exclude pluripotent cells from its range, arriving at the conclusion that the handling of
and research on pluripotent hESCs as such is not prohibited by the Act. It therefore
remains unclear to what extent the patenting of pluripotent hESCs per se is possible in
Germany. Ultimately it will be a matter for the courts to decide.194
The legal situation becomes more complicated when considering other relevant
legislation. Even though it is impossible to establish hESC lines in Germany due to the
EPA, ongoing research on hESC lines is in fact conducted within the Federal Republic.
This apparent legal and practical contradiction is possible because the Stem Cell Act
2002 permits the importation of externally established stem cell lines into Germany.195
The term ‘embryonic stem cells’ is defined in the Stem Cell Act as ‘pluripotent stem
cells derived from embryos’.196 It has been argued that the patenting of hESC lines
produced outside Germany, lines derived from them, or modifications of both of these, if
imported legally and in compliance with the Stem Cell Act, would be at least
theoretically possible, because the decisive ground for the prohibition of patenting does
not apply in these cases.197 This situation, however, overlooks the impact of the
reference from the Patents Act to the EPA. The latter is used to limit the patentable area
and to interpret the embryo exclusion and, in that sense, the origin of the material should
be of a subordinate nature. The patenting of inventions involving hESCs is in fact
dependent on the invention in question and whether the use of human embryos for
industrial or commercial purposes is required for the exploitation of the invention, and
not on the origin of the cells.198 This has also been the position of a recent court decision.
In 2006, the German Federal Patent Court199 (GFPC) gave judgment in Brüstle v
Greenpeace200 relating to biotechnological research undertaken by the German
neuroscientist Dr. Oliver Brustle. In 1999, the German Patent Office granted Brüstle a
national patent that claims the use of hESCs for the treatment of neural deficiencies such
as Parkinson’s disease and Multiple Sclerosis.201 The Examining Division of the EPO
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also granted, in 2006, a European patent on hESC derivatives to Brüstle.202 The claims of
the European patent are indistinguishable from the national patent except for a
qualification that has been inserted throughout the claims stating that the procedures do
not involve the destruction of human embryos.203 Greenpeace brought nullity
proceedings against the national patent asserting that it was against public order and
morality arguing the fact that the stem cells had been long cultivated outside the human
body is irrelevant: at the beginning of the chain an embryo had to be killed to harvest the
cells. Greenpeace stated that human life starts with the fusion of sperm and ovum, and
blastocysts are embryos in the sense of the law. Brüstle counters that in the patent claims
the use of stem cell lines which were harvested from blastocysts 4-5 days after
fertilization, and therefore before the blastocyst can be rightfully called an embryo.
The GFPC invalidated the national patent as contrary to Article 6(2)(c) notwithstanding
the grant of the European patent only six months earlier.204 According to the GFPC, it
did not matter whether the cells in the application were pluripotent or totipotent, since
the invention necessitated the use (by destruction) of the human embryos, although none
of the claims related to the production of ESC from human embryos but only
encompassed hESCs that were readily available from existing cell lines. According to
the GFPC, the patent did not reveal any other ways of using the invention, which did not
lead to the destruction of human embryos.205 The decision seems to pay less attention to
the origin of the stem cells than to the technical teaching of the invention and the
characteristics of the subject matter involved.
If this decision is upheld it would make a strong argument that the origin of the material
has no impact on the patentability of hESC inventions in Germany, despite the
distinction made in the applicable legislation with respect to the origin of the stem
cells.206 The reasoning of the Court is in line with the approach adopted thus far by the
EPO decisions in both Edinburgh and WARF, focusing on the making of the claimed
product as an integral part of the invention.207 It is debatable whether such an enquiry
should be part of the examination.208 As the ECJ noted in the Netherlands case, the
Directive ‘concerns only the grant of patents and whose scope does not therefore extend
to activities before and after that grant, whether they involve research or the use of the
patented products’.209
Dr. Brüstle is appealing against the GFPC ruling in the national courts, and because of
the potential Constitutional issues raised by the case, on 21 January 2010 the German
Supreme Court referred to the ECJ questions regarding the interpretation of Article
6(2)(c) of Directive. From the perspective of EU law, on the natural reading of Article
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6(2)(c), the Brüstle patent would not involve a violation of Article 6(2)(c) since the
claims are not to industrial and commercial uses of human embryos.210 The ECJ will
ultimately have to determine whether Germany may refuse patent protection to hESC
inventions under Article 6(1) in recognition of fundamental principles of the German
Constitution.211 In addition, the ECJ will now have to rule on the interpretation of
‘human embryo’ in the sense of Article 6(2)(c). Is a stem cell derived from a blastocyst,
which has lost its ability to develop into a human still an embryo? If so, is a blastocyst a
human embryo? If so, is purely therapeutic use of stem cells a ‘commercial or industrial
purpose’ in the sense of Article 6? The ruling could make or break biotechnology patent
applications claiming the use of hESCs with ramifications for the biotechnology industry
in Europe.212 In the increasingly complex European patent map, the corresponding
European Brüstle patent is being opposed at the EPO by the Geron Corporation.213 The
question now arises as to whether the European Brüstle patent is consistent with the
EBA ruling within the EPC. On a ‘narrow’ reading of the EBA’s WARF ruling, the
Brüstle application could conceivably be distinguished from the WARF application on
the grounds that the claims to the isolation and differentiation of the neuroprogenitor
cells do not involve destruction of a human embryo, as repeated throughout the
European application.214
VI. THE PATENTING OF hESCS IN THE UNITED STATES
Article I, § 8, clause 8 of the U.S. Constitution grants Congress broad power to legislate
‘to promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to
Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries.’
The First Congress enacted the Patent Act 1790 that, in addition to novelty, required the
invention to be ‘sufficiently useful and important’.215 The relevant legislative history of
the second U.S. Patent Act, the Patent Act of 1793, supports a broad construction of
patent law, defining statutory subject matter as ‘any new and useful art, machine,
manufacture, or composition of matter, or any new or useful improvement thereof’. The
Act embodied Thomas Jefferson’s philosophy that ‘ingenuity should receive a liberal
encouragement’.216 In 1952, when patent laws where re-codified, Congress replaced the
word ‘art’ with ‘process’ in Title 35 U.S. Code (U.S.C.) s101, but otherwise left
Jefferson’s language intact.217 Today, Title 35 U.S.C. s101 of the Patent Act 1952 still
governs U.S. patent law. This is not to suggest that s101 has no limits or that it embraces
every discovery. The laws of nature, physical phenomena, and abstract ideas are
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categories of subject matter outside of s101. Such discoveries are ‘manifestations of
nature, free to all men and reserved exclusively to none’.218 The four classes of statutory
subject matter (i.e. any art, machine, manufacture or composition of matter) under s101
are flexible, with the U.S. Supreme Court, in Kewanee Oil Co. v Bicron Corp,219
asserting that patent law was an evolving legal science designed to cover all emerging
technologies.220
i.

The Link Between Utility and Morality

Courts in the U.S. were often willing to withhold patents for inventions they considered
immoral, such as inventions used to defraud buyers and machines used for gambling.
Although U.S. patent law has no morality clause per se, because moral norms were often
enforced in the courts by means of the utility requirement, the link between ‘utility’ and
‘morality’ is important.221 The U.S. concept of utility is both broader and narrower than
the notion of industrial application under the EPC.222 It is a broader concept in that the
same word encompasses elements such as morality and illegality. It is narrower in that
pure research is not held to equal a practical utility.223
The principle of utility was judicially laid down in the 1817 decision of Justice Story in
Lowell v Lewis.224 In that decision, he explained that ‘all that the law requires is that the
invention should not be frivolous or injurious to the well-being, good policy, or sound
morals of society. The word ‘useful’, therefore, is incorporated into the Act225 in
contradistinction to mischievous or immoral’.226 Unfortunately, however, Justice Story
could not have anticipated the wonders of modern science.227
ii.

Diamond v Chakrabarty – U.S. Patent Liberalization

In Diamond v. Chakrabarty228 the U.S. Supreme Court held that Title 35 U.S.C. s101 is
to be interpreted broadly due to the deliberate use of ‘any’ in conjunction with expansive
terms such as ‘manufacture’ and ‘composition of matter’ found in the provision. The
decision, taking into consideration the legislative intention of Congress under the 1952
Act,229 has been widely interpreted to hold that ‘anything under the sun that is made by
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man’ is patentable.230 The Court gave a green light to biotech researchers and investors
by confirming that ‘life’ can comprise patent-eligible subject matter. Acknowledging the
possible repercussions of its decision, the Court noted the ‘gruesome parade of horribles’
identified by the USPTO and amici as potentially resulting from biotechnology patents.
The Court, however, declared itself to be ‘without competence’ even to entertain such
morality-laden ‘high policy’ arguments. In broadly construing s101, the Court identified
its role as ‘the narrow one of determining what Congress meant by the words it used in
the statute; once that is done, our powers are exhausted.’231
Consequently, the s101 subject matter prong of patent eligibility does not provide a bar
to the patenting of morally controversial biotech subject matter.232 The Chakrabarty
decision is important in appreciating the Courts emphasis on limiting judicially created
exceptions to patentable subject matter under s101.233 As a result living biological
materials have been patented in the U.S.
Shortly after the Chakrabarty decision, the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit
(CAFC) was created to promote greater uniformity in the application of U.S. patent law,
and to reduce the possibility of forum shopping by parties seeking favorable courts.234
The CAFC now has exclusive jurisdiction over all appeals in patent cases. From its
creation, the CAFC has been decidedly ‘pro-patent’. The CAFC has provided much
needed clarification of standards for interpreting patent rights and increased
predictability in the application of patent laws. Clearly, such a development is welcome.
By contrast, because the EPO is not an EU institution, legislative reform of this nature is
not possible.235
iii. Property in Human Beings and the Thirteenth Amendment
The USPTO in response to the Board of Patent Appeals Ex Parte Allen236 decision
regarding the patenting of multi-cellular animals, issued a notice stating explicitly that it
considered ‘a claim directed to or including within its scope a human being will not be
considered to be patentable subject matter under s101. The grant of a limited, but
exclusive property right in a human being is prohibited by the Constitution.’237 This
Constitutional reference was to the prohibition of slavery under the Thirteenth
Amendment of the Constitution, which states that ‘neither slavery nor involuntary
servitude, except as punishment for crime whereof the party shall have been duly
convicted, shall exist within the U.S., or any place subject to their jurisdiction.’238
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Bagley suggests Roe v. Wade239 holds that at their earliest stages of development,
embryos are not constitutionally protected as ‘persons.’240 This holding suggests that, at
a minimum, the Thirteenth Amendment would not bar patents on human embryos.241
Whilst the USPTO’s response to Ex Parte Allen clarified its position regarding the
patenting of non-human multi-cellular organisms, it did nothing to reconcile its treatment
of ‘isolated human biological material’ with that of ‘human beings’. This weakness was
exploited when, in 1997, Jeremy Rifkin, a prominent opponent of biotechnology, and Dr.
Stuart Newman, a cellular biologist at New York Medical College, filed a patent
application covering the production of human-animal chimeras by inserting the genetic
material from one species into an embryo of another to create, in effect, ‘human-animal’
chimeras.242 The objective in filing the application was to ‘raise these ethical issues
before the public and the legal system in a particularly dramatic fashion.’243 Because
Newman had failed to place limits on the percentage of human cells in the invention, the
USPTO found that the invention could embrace a human being and issued a rejection of
the patent in 1999.244 In a media advisory released in response to the public outcry
associated with the Newman application, the USPTO relied on the moral utility doctrine
stating that the Newman chimeras could not be patentable because they would fail to
meet the public policy and morality aspects of the utility requirement.’245 The NewmanRifkin patent application represents an instance where, arguably, the USPTO asked
morality questions first, but lacked the authority to do so.246 By issuing the press release,
the USPTO showed that it is willing to continue to rely on Justice Story’s formulation of
utility in Lowell v Lewis. The Newman application suggests the link between ‘utility’
and ‘morality’ is especially relevant for modern biotechnological inventions.247
iv. Rejection of the Doctrine of Moral Utility
The reference by the USPTO to the moral utility doctrine is curious for a number of
reasons. Firstly, when releasing ‘Utility Guidelines’ in 1998, the USPTO Commissioner
stated that ‘if an applicant presents a scientifically plausible use for the claimed
invention, it will be sufficient to satisfy the utility requirement.’248 This is in line with
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the 1952 Act,249 which provides that a person is entitled to a patent if his or her invention
meets the statutory patentability requirements specified in the Act.250 Secondly, the 2001
Examination Guidelines for the Utility Requirement make no mention of morality or,
indeed, public policy issues.251 Thirdly, the decision in Juicy Whip Inc. v Orange Bang
Inc252 explicitly sounded the death-knell for the moral utility requirement.253 Thus, a
combination of the demise of the moral utility doctrine, along with the expansive judicial
interpretations of the scope of patent-eligible subject matter, has resulted in virtually no
basis on which the USPTO or courts can deny patent protection to morally controversial,
but otherwise patentable, subject matter.254
In 2001, in contrast to Europe, the USPTO granted the equivalent WARF patent based on
the same claims and work carried out by James Thomson.255 By 2004, a number of
patents had been issued with claims to hESC products or processes.256 For example, the
patent issued to the Geron Corporation for ‘methods and materials for the growth of
primate-derived primordial stem cells in feeder-free culture’257 claims a cellular
composition comprising undifferentiated primate primordial stem cells, which includes
both pluripotent and totipotent primate stem cells, but does not exclude human primate
stem cells. It appears then that, in the U.S., human pluripotent and totipotent stem cells
are patentable, despite the fact that human beings at any stage of development are not
patentable.258 By 2006, the USPTO had granted in excess of forty-one patents that claim
hESCs in their title and front pages.259 These include patents on culture methods,
differentiated cells derived from hESCs and even hESCs per se.260 Indeed the Geron
Corporation has recently announced that it has received clearance from the U.S. Food
and Drug Administration to begin the world’s first human clinical trial of hESC based
therapy for patients with acute spinal cord injury.261
v.

The Full Frontal Attack on Biotechnology Patents

In Association for Molecular Pathology et al. v USPTO et al., (Myriad)262 a U.S. District
Court Judge recently struck down seven patents related to two genes linked to breast and
ovarian cancer. The decision, if upheld, could throw into doubt patents covering
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thousands of human genes and reshape the law of intellectual property in the U.S.263 In
his opinion,264 Sweet J., noting the Supreme Court judgment in Diamond v.
Chakrabarty, stated this broad reading of 35 U.S.C. s.101 and statutory patent eligibility
is not without limits. Sweet J. agreed with the plaintiff’s basic argument that the
‘isolated’ DNA that Myriad claimed to have patented is still a product of nature, and
cannot be covered by patents. If upheld in the event of an appeal, the USPTO will need
to make sure its practices conform to the decision, and avoid issuing patents related to
isolated DNA. That leaves a big ‘if,’ considering that the next level, the U.S. Court of
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, is a court that is considered patent-friendly and likely to
reject, or at least narrow, such a broad challenge to gene patents.265
With a final resolution to Myriad likely several years away, a variety of other legal
developments are slowly but surely reshaping the biotechnology patent landscape in the
U.S.266 A perfect example of this is the decision of April 28 2010 by the Board of Patent
Appeals of the USPTO to invalidate one267 of WARF’s patents on stem cell cultures.268
This archetypal example of a ‘broad patent’ on hESCs raised criticism of market abuse
and was the subject of an unsuccessful review following a challenge brought by the
Foundation Taxpayer and Consumer Rights and the Public Patent Foundation.269 The
challenge to the WARF patent is particularly noteworthy in that the motivation was
undoubtedly ‘moral’ and driven by concerns that the USPTO had been overgenerous in
granting the patent. But, crucially, the challenge did not take place in the realm of
morality, but was focused instead on the USPTO’s application of the technical criteria of
novelty and inventive step/non-obviousness.270 The Board ruled that the WARF claims
were anticipated by a 1992 patent and were obvious in light of ‘significant guideposts’ in
the prior art. After some additional USPTO proceedings, there may be an appeal to the
Federal Circuit.
vi. Reinstatement of Federal Funding for hESC Research
In March 2009, President Barrack Obama, in one of his first Executive Orders271
reversed the Bush era ethics-driven ban on U.S. federal funding for hESC research.272
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President Obama stated that ‘the purpose of this order is to remove limitations on
scientific inquiry, to expand support for the exploration of human stem cell research, and
in so doing to enhance the contribution of America's scientists to important new
discoveries and new therapies for the benefit of humankind.’273 This is good news for
anyone hoping for a cure for spinal cord injuries and degenerative diseases,274 but not for
the EU biotechnology industry.275
CONCLUSION
The Commission’s aim of establishing a consistent and unified approach towards the
patenting of biotechnological inventions within Europe has not been achieved. The
inconsistent application of the moral exclusion clause under the Biotechnology Directive
has lead to legal uncertainty surrounding biotechnology inventions claiming hESCs
within Europe. The uncertainty lies in the absence of a common European morality and a
uniform legal definition of the human embryo. To add to this uncertainty, patent
protection in Europe operates on three levels with differing institutional connections –
the EPO, the EU, and the national states.276 Whilst the ECJ is the court vested with
supreme authority over the interpretation of the Directive, the fragmented institutional
framework in Europe on the examination and grant of European patents and the postgrant determination of their validity, means the whilst the EPO acts as a first filter on
European patents, the legal validity of the patent is subject to review in the national
courts.277 The biggest hurdle to achieving true European integration in patent protection
is the absence of a centralized litigation system with a single judicial body able to rule
definitely on the validity and infringements of European patents. The co-existence of a
plethora of national enforcement mechanisms is not only extremely costly and lengthy
but leads to forum shopping, complex cross-border litigation and considerable legal
uncertainty. There is support for the establishment of a European Patent Court with a
Court of First Instance and a Court of Appeal similar to that in the U.S.278
Given that a European Patent Court is a long way off, the EPO, who does not have the
legitimacy to act as an arbiter of European morality, must consider the U.S. model of
patenting first and asking questions later. A return to the ‘public abhorrence’ test set out
in Howard Florey, invoking the moral exclusion in rare circumstances, would provide a
greater degree of legal certainty for biotechnological inventions within Europe. Article
6(1) may constitute the legal basis for a Member State to invalidate a patent once it is
transformed into a national patent if their view upon the human embryo dictates such
action. It seems even more appropriate to allow each Member State decide upon whether
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or not the destruction of the human embryo constitutes a valid criterion in regard to the
application of Article 6(2)(c).279
The decision in WARF has added to the uncertainty surrounding the moral exclusion in
Europe.280 It is a missed opportunity to clarify the law regarding the patentability of
hESCs within Europe and therefore also a missed opportunity to restore the legal
credibility of the EPO who will eventually have to decide upon the issue of patents
claiming hESC lines and new technology for extracting hESCs without destroying the
embryo.281 The incentive offered by U.S. patent law is particularly important for
biotechnology inventions.282 The past success of its patent system is a direct result of its
ability to evolve and adapt to changing times and new technologies as they arise.283 This
has the effect of giving international corporations an additional incentive to seek
protection first in the U.S. where morality is not a factor.284 Now that the U.S. has started
to dismantle its barriers to investment in hESC research, Europe needs to get its act
together, and quickly, as the inconsistent application of the Biotechnology Directive’s
moral exclusion clause could undermine investor confidence in Europe, providing a
competitive advantage to the U.S.285
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